Review Of  Beyond Objectivism And Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, And Praxis  By R. J. Bernstein by Eldridge, Richard Thomas
Swarthmore College 
Works 
Philosophy Faculty Works Philosophy 
10-1-1984 
Review Of "Beyond Objectivism And Relativism: Science, 
Hermeneutics, And Praxis" By R. J. Bernstein 
Richard Thomas Eldridge 
Swarthmore College, reldrid1@swarthmore.edu 
This work is brought to you for free and open access by . It has been accepted for inclusion in Philosophy Faculty 
Works by an authorized administrator of Works. For more information, please contact myworks@swarthmore.edu. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://works.swarthmore.edu/fac-philosophy 
 Part of the Philosophy Commons 
Let us know how access to these works benefits you 
 
Recommended Citation 
Richard Thomas Eldridge. (1984). "Review Of "Beyond Objectivism And Relativism: Science, 
Hermeneutics, And Praxis" By R. J. Bernstein". Philosophy And Literature. Volume 8, Issue 2. 292-293. DOI: 
10.1353/phl.1984.0029 
https://works.swarthmore.edu/fac-philosophy/301 
%H\RQG2EMHFWLYLVPDQG5HODWLYLVP6FLHQFH+HUPHQHXWLFV
DQG3UD[LVUHYLHZ
5LFKDUG(OGULGJH
Philosophy and Literature, Volume 8, Number 2, October 1984, pp.
292-293 (Review)
3XEOLVKHGE\-RKQV+RSNLQV8QLYHUVLW\3UHVV
DOI: 10.1353/phl.1984.0029
For additional information about this article
                                                      Access provided by Swarthmore College (19 Aug 2015 20:55 GMT)
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/phl/summary/v008/8.2.eldridge.html
292Philosophy and Literature
metaphysical dialectics of Marcuse, Adorno, and Sartre, and by using it to undermine
Lacan's "phallocentrism" and "semiocentrism," and Habermas's ideal speech/communica-
tion dieory. In this Marxist/deconstructionist light, Ryan interprets Capital: he insists on
die interpénétration ("differentiality") of politics and economics, and rejects necessary
("decidable") historical laws. Ryan also examines Lenin's systematic misreading ofMarx,
where decentralized communism becomes the basis for statism, oppression, and transcen-
dent trudis.
Ryan applies this Marxist/deconstructionist theory to many contemporary issues. He
considers ideological elements in everyday views of terrorism, feminism, liberalism,
human rights, social planning, credit, and foreign policy. He criticizes traditional views of
academic freedom, disciplinary study, and die relation of American education to
business, and offers suggestions for "radical teachers." Finally, he explores common direc-
tions in Marxism/deconstruction, (Rowbotham's) socialist feminism, and (Negri's)
autonomy dieory in terms of human needs, agency, and social categories and organiza-
tion.
Ryan writes with exceptional clarity, and raises indisputably important issues.
However, his project suffers from four fundamental weaknesses. (1) Deconstruction, as
critique of metaphysics, may be alloyed with Marxism (minus metaphysics — or any "ism"
minus metaphysics) but it is not clear that this strengtiiens Marxism. Many have
understood Marx's Capital, dialectics, and relation to Leninism much as Ryan does
without reference to deconstruction. Ryan says people die for being Marxists but not for
being deconstructionists; we may lament this injustice, but calling Marx a "proto-
deconstructionist" while claiming deconstruction lacks a social dieory seems
unilluminating. (2) Ryan's arguments are weak, self-referentially naive, and cry for
"deconstruction." His dichotomies — metaphysical/non-metaphysical, ideological/non-
ideological, theoretical/practical — constitute a "metaphysical system of priorities and
oppositions." Ryan never subjects his views to his own criticisms. (3) Ryan gives no argu-
ment for his leftist/radical political goals. Whatever one's sympathies, argument is needed
(especially for sweeping proclamations that, e.g. , connect Searle's philosophy to torture in
Chile). While he claims that "revolution is not a party" matter (vive la différante!), Ryan
appears a party man. He attempts to base his politics on deconstruction, but deconstruc-
tion is incompatible with diis notion of basis, and all political issues are "undecidable"
within deconstruction. (4) Ryan claims practical rather than scholarly goals. Granting
this dualism, does the book succeed? I see no evidence to answer affirmatively, but
perhaps Ryan does "keep open the question of revolution." This in itself is important.
WhitmanCollegeJohnJ. Stuhr
Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and
Praxis, by Richard J. Bernstein; xvi & 284 pp. Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983, $25.00 clothbound, $8.95
paper.
Beyond Objectivism and Relativism is a survey of recent dunking about knowledge and
justification. Focusing on Kuhn, Winch, and Gadamer, Bernstein traces the emergence
of historicist theories of justification in both the natural and human sciences. What
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justifies a theory in physics, anthropology, or literary criticism is not, as Kuhn, Winch,
and Gadamer have shown, its having been formulated in accordance with a
philosophically established decision procedure or scientific method. Descartes and his
logical positivist successors were wrong to think there is an ahistorical scientific method
(p. 128). Any mediods of justification which have ever been employed or which we can
imagine necessarily depend upon at least some tacit unargued traditional presuppositions.
To many of their immediate readers, Kuhn, Winch, and Gadamer seemed to be urg-
ing a variety of relativism, arguing that all scientific mediods and standards of rational
justification are local and arbitrary. In fact, however, it has become clear (partly through
the work of such later figures as Feyerabend, Lakatos, Rorty, Geertz, and Habermas)
that the epistemológica! views of Kuhn, Winch, and Gadamer were not intended to sup-
port relativism and, moreover, do not. Instead, a dieory can be justified historically if it
can be shown to satisfy criteria of theory choice which have been (in a phrase Bernstein
borrows from Rorty) "hammered out" in the course of past inquiry (p. 67). What this
seems to mean is that criteria of theory choice evolve historically along with actual
dieories. The task of an inquirer, in seeking to justify a theory at a historical moment, is to
discern which parts of his tradition — perhaps its art, its physics, its epistemology, or its
sociology — are most plausible and worth preserving and to modify either his theories or
criteria of theory choice in light of a judgment about what in his tradition is sound. The
ability to judge or discern what in a tradition is sound is not governed by formalizable
rules. Rationality has a "judgmental" or "practical" character (p. 74). It is more like prac-
tical wisdom, the ability to respond appropriately in various situations in which one is
called upon to act, dian it is like the ability to prove theorems. Knowledge of what in a
tradition is sound is more like knowledge of a person, in resting on long acquaintance and
sympatiiy, than it is like knowledge of a fact. Finally, practical wisdom can be developed
and exercised only under certain specific social conditions, as Habermas and Arendt in
particular have emphasized (p. 169). Historical consciousness must be valued and
encouraged, not systematically inhibited as it is in modern technological society, if prac-
tical wisdom is to flourish and justifiable theory choices are to be made.
Bernstein's summaries of both post-Kuhnian philosophy of science and Gadamerian
hermeneutics are masterful: lucid, non-technical, and sound. Philosophers of both
analytic and Continental temperament, social theorists, anthropologists, and literary
scholars will all find work in fields diey may have thought foreign to them made both
accessible and interesting.
Yet Bernstein's positive account of the criteria of rational theory choice is thin and
unconvincing. He discusses no concrete cases of theory choice which are rationally
justifiable by his lights, and in the absence of any such discussion it is hard to see what his
criteria come to. Vague talk about the historical "hammering out" of criteria of dieory
choice is empty unless concretely illustrated.
Bernstein's construal of objectivism as die thesis diat "there is or must be some perma-
nent, ahistorical matrix or framework to which we can ultimately appeal in determining
the nature of rationality, knowledge, truth, reality, goodness or Tightness" (p. 8) is both
idiosyncratic and fuzzy. It is not clear that Bernstein actually wishes to reject and move
beyond objectivism, given his view that we must appeal to historical facts in seeking
justifications because of the very nature of rationality, not merely because of historical
contingencies.
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